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Barack Obama’s current war powers can be traced back to the
time of FDR
In September, a great deal of the debate over the potential for U.S. intervention in Syria centered
on President Barack Obama’s ability to take action without consulting Congress. While many
argued that this consultation was necessary, modern presidencies have been characterised by a
lack of constraints where national security is concerned. Richard Moe traces the President’s
current war powers back to the re-election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt for a third term in
1940. He writes that FDR’s leadership at the onset of World War II led to an expansion of the
President’s war powers that continued for the following seven decades.
Earlier this year, Barack Obama became the first president in recent memory to propose limiting the powers of his
office when he called for reigning in the use of drones. “Unless we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our
actions,” he said on 23 May 2013 referring to the expanded authority of the presidency after 9/11, “we may be
drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or continue to grant presidents unbound powers more suited for
traditional armed conflicts.”
Virtually every president since the Second World War has vigorously protected the executive powers he inherited,
and several sought to expand those powers further. The net result is a modern presidency with few constraints
built into it when national security in involved. Chief executives have come to employ American power abroad on
their own initiative so frequently, particularly in the age of terrorism, that it has become disturbingly commonplace.
This development was effectively
given birth on 5 November 1940,
when President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was elected to an
unprecedented third term. The
actions he took immediately
before and after that election
planted the seeds of the national
security state we have become
today. At a time when our
headlines are dominated by the
NSC, the CIA, the NSA, and the
myriad alphabet agencies that
constitute our national security
infrastructure, it’s hard to imagine
a time when they didn’t exist. It’s
even harder to imagine a time
when they didn’t seem
necessary.
By 1939 Roosevelt had long
planned to retire to his beloved
Hyde Park when his second term
ended in January 1941. He was
tired, broke, and the New Deal had run its course. Much as he loved being president, he believed his place in
history was assured; it was time to go home.
All that changed in September 1939, of course, when Adolf Hitler invaded Poland, causing Great Britain and
France to declare war on Germany. FDR became convinced that if those countries fell, the war would come to the
Americas. So, despite rampant isolationism in the country, he persuaded Congress to amend the Neutrality Act
and made it his top priority to get them everything they needed “short of war.” The rest is well known: In May 1940
Hitler unleashed the new military art of blitzkrieg and conquered virtually all of continental Europe, including
France. Only Britain remained in his path, but most believed that its days too were numbered.
FDR couldn’t find another Democrat who supported his policies and whom he believed could be elected.
Concluding he was best qualified to steer the country through this crisis, Roosevelt allowed himself to be
“drafted,” which is to say he decided to run.
Although the consummate politician doing all he could to win a tough and hard fought race, FDR never forgot why
he was running: he was preparing America for the war he knew was coming. In August 1940, three months before
the election, he supported the first peacetime draft in American history and, without seeking congressional
approval, he sent fifty aging but desperately needed destroyers to Britain in exchange for naval bases in the
Caribbean. Both measures were hugely controversial and involved significant political risk.
He used his election victory as a mandate to persuade Congress to enact Lend-Lease, which gave the president
extraordinary powers to send aid to Britain and other allies. His opponents said he was becoming a dictator.
The combination of these actions led directly to changes in the presidency itself and especially to the tools
available to it. Until FDR made Harry Hopkins his de facto national security advisor in 1941, he had no White
House staff to assist him; not until after the war would a formal National Security Council be created. Roosevelt
had no formal intelligence apparatus on which to rely; his information from abroad was largely ad hoc, not
infrequently provided by friends and former Harvard classmates returning from Europe. The president today has a
loose collection of intelligence organizations too numerous and complicated for most people to understand.
The leadership Roosevelt exhibited in 1940 and early 1941 succeeded in piercing the veil of isolationism that had
defined the country’s foreign policy since its earliest days. Thereafter the United States would be seriously
engaged in the affairs of the world, perhaps never more so than in recent years. The neo-isolationists in the
Congress today are but a faint echo of those who sought to thwart Roosevelt’s efforts to aid Britain.
After the 1940 election the American electorate would view the presidency very differently, and use expanded
criteria in evaluating candidates. The question that year was which candidate was best qualified to protect the
American people; polls showed that voters answered it decisively in FDR’s favor.
Elections matter and the election of 1940 matters still for its profound effect in shaping the internationalist nation
we have become. But after nearly three quarters of a century it is time, as President Obama suggested, that we
consider disciplining “our thinking, our definitions, our actions” with some thoughtful and measured restraint.
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